Agent Based Intrusion Detection and Response System for Wireless LANs by Chirumamilla, Mohan K & Ramamurthy, Byrav
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
CSE Conference and Workshop Papers Computer Science and Engineering, Department of 
2003 
Agent Based Intrusion Detection and Response System for 
Wireless LANs 
Mohan K Chirumamilla 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, mohankc@cse.unl.edu 
Byrav Ramamurthy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bramamurthy2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Chirumamilla, Mohan K and Ramamurthy, Byrav, "Agent Based Intrusion Detection and Response System 
for Wireless LANs" (2003). CSE Conference and Workshop Papers. 64. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cseconfwork/64 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in CSE Conference and 
Workshop Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
 Agent Based Intrusion Detection and Response 
System for Wireless LANs 
Mohan K Chirumamilla 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, NE, 68588-0115 U.S.A. 
mohankc@cse.unl.edu 
Byrav Ramamurthy 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, NE, 68588-0115 U.S.A. 
byrav@cse.unl.edu 
 
Abstract— Wireless LAN technology, despite the 
numerous advantages it has over competing technologies, has 
not seen widespread deployment. A primary reason for 
markets not adopting this technology is its failure to provide 
adequate security. Data that is sent over wireless links can be 
compromised with utmost ease. In this project, we propose a 
distributed agent based intrusion detection and response 
system for wireless LANs that can detect unauthorized wireless 
elements like access points, wireless clients that are in 
promiscuous mode etc. The system reacts to intrusions by 
either notifying the concerned personnel, in case of rogue 
access points and promiscuous nodes, or by blocking 
unauthorized users from accessing the network resources.  
Keywords— Wireless LANs, Intrusion Detection, Security, 
Rogue Access Point,  promiscuous nodes. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Security has always been a concern in communication 
networks as it is in many other areas. The important typical 
security issues that one should consider are, threats to the 
physical network, unauthorized access to network resources, 
internal and external attacks. In the context of wired LANs, 
the solutions to the above issues are well defined and are 
fairly reliable. The same approaches, however, cannot be 
directly adapted to  wireless LANs. 
A. Security in the Wireless Networks  
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the security protocol 
provided in the IEEE 802.11 [8] wireless standard to bring 
the security in wireless networks comparable to the security 
in wired networks. Its main objective is to protect the data 
that is transmitted over wireless links from malicious 
eavesdroppers. WEP tries to accomplish its goal by 
encrypting the data that is being transmitted at the MAC 
layer.  
The main scheme that is being employed in WEP is 
Shared key authentication. Shared key cryptography is used 
to authenticate and also to communicate with a mobile node. 
However, studies [1, 2, 4] have proved WEP to be a 
complete failure. In [1] it has been shown that WEP can be 
compromised by successfully modifying the data, injecting 
fake data and decrypting the data. As a result it has been 
proved that Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA) are all not achieved with WEP. A recent study [4] 
has shown how packets can be forged in a wireless 
environment, despite the protection offered by WEP2 ( an 
improved version of WEP which is not yet standardized). 
Last but not the least, inventors of RC4 encryption algorithm 
have exposed a weakness in their algorithm, which 
indirectly has a significant impact on the credibility of its 
use in wireless environments.  
Taking advantage of all the above weaknesses, one could 
easily break into a wireless network with a minimal setup, a 
laptop and a wireless card (which allows RF monitoring). To 
make things worse, this kind of eavesdropping can be 
carried in a completely passive undetectable mode.  
B. Intrusion into WirelessLANs 
Intrusion, in the field of networks, is defined as the act of 
wrongfully accessing the network resources without having 
appropriate privileges. Intrusion into wireless networks is 
relatively easier when compared to wired networks. 
Wireless networks are highly susceptible to intrusion 
because of the radio technology that is being used. An 
intrusion into wireless networks can be carried in two ways, 
either by passively sniffing the wireless network or by 
physically installing access points on the wired network in 
unnoticed places. 
Passively sniffing the network is the easiest intrusion 
that one can attempt with just a wireless card and a laptop. 
The wireless card can be slipped into RFMODE 
(promiscuous mode) and all the data in the air can be 
sniffed. Intrusion of this kind is possible if and only if the 
network has wireless access points installed on the wired 
network. In the case where the network has inaccessible 
access points, one can intrude into a corporate network by 
gaining physical access to the wired network and installing a 
rogue access point. In either case, the attacks can either be 
internal – attack carried by people within the organization – 
or external – attack carried by people outside the 
organization. In the latter type of intrusion, it is as simple as 
passively sniffing the network once the access point is 
installed.  
II. OUR CONTRIBUTION 
In our work, we designed and implemented a fully 
secured agent-based intrusion detection system that detects 
the presence of unauthorized wireless elements, namely, 
rogue access points, wireless promiscuous nodes and 
unauthorized clients. Depending on the kind of wireless 
element detected, the system would respond accordingly. In 
the case of the wireless element being a rogue access point 
or a wireless promiscuous node, the response would be 
sending the relevant information such as the geographical 
information, the time when the element was detected, etc. to 
the concerned personnel. If the wireless element turns out to 
This work was supported in part by the U. S. National Science 
Foundation grant (ANI-0074121) and the UNL MoCoRePro project. 
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 be an unauthorized client, the response would be blocking 
that client from getting onto the network, thus preventing 
unauthorized access.  
Our solution to protect the wireless network mainly 
focuses on detecting intrusions as soon as possible and 
preventing them up to a certain level. Another important 
aspect of this project is its vendor independence. This 
solution can be deployed in a fully heterogeneous 
environment unlike other vendor specific solutions. Other 
advantages it has over similar tools like  Netstumbler [5], 
Kismet [6] is its ability to gather information about the 
whole wireless network and communicate back with the 
central location. One tool that is similar but not the same, is 
Airtraf [7]. AirTraf is a database-aware software that mainly 
detects rogue access points across the organization and 
communicates back to a central server. Our solution is 
different from AirTraf, by providing extra features like, 
detecting promiscuous nodes, blocking unauthorized users 
from accessing the network resources, and providing x.509 
certificates to the users of the wireless networks. The x.509 
certificates can be used by the wireless network users to 
protect their wireless data by using a virtual private network 
(VPN).  
So our solution accomplishes all the threes A's 
(Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) that WEP 
was supposed to offer, in a completely heterogeneous 
environment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
In the section III we will discuss the design issues. In section 
IV we will discuss the implementation and test bed details. 
In section V we will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages (limitations) and possible future extensions 
that can be made to the present system. In section VI we 
conclude our work.  
III. DESIGN  
One of the main characteristic features of radio is 
attenuation of the signal with distance. Due to this inherent 
property of wireless technology, we need to have multiple 
access points located at various locations to have a 
reasonable amount of wireless coverage. So given an area 
where a wireless network has to be deployed, it can be 
logically divided into cells as shown in Fig 1. Agents are 
deployed in all the cells and are connected to the wireless 
back bone as shown in Fig 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 An area divided into logical cells. 
In order to provide wireless connectivity in a particular 
cell, the access point should be connected to the agent (as 
shown in Fig 2) that also acts as a firewall. The agents, in 
the absence of access points, act as sniffers, looking for 
rogue access points and promiscuous nodes in their 
respective cells. In the case of an access point being present, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Overview of the architecture. 
the agents act as both sniffers and firewalls, to stop 
unauthorized users from accessing the network resources 
and to detect unauthorized wireless elements. In the 
following sections we explore the details of the system by 
closely examining at the roles played by the agents and the 
central administrator. 
A. Central Administrator 
The central administrator is the main central server that 
acts as the centralized-entity to monitor all the wireless cells 
in the network. It maintains the information of all the access 
points and agents present on the network. It also maintains 
the list of all clients which can use the wireless network. 
Should a new access point or wireless client be installed on 
the network, it has to be registered with the central 
administrator; otherwise, it would be considered as an 
unauthorized element. The central administrator maintains a 
record for each access point which consists of information 
about the geographical location it is serving, its MAC 
address, the name and IP address of the agent present in that 
cell, status of WEP etc. This information can help network 
administrators in taking strategic decisions in strengthening 
the security of the network. In addition to this information it 
also maintains critical information about the client card like 
its MAC address and the public key. The following are the 
functions offered by the central administrator 
• Registering and deregistering access points (AP), client 
cards, and agents; 
• Scanning the network; 
• Generating x.509 certificates for client cards; and 
• Acting as a VPN server for the whole wireless network. 
When a wireless element like an access point or a 
wireless client card, is registered, the central administrator 
will send the element’s information to all the agents. The 
agents upon receiving this information act accordingly 
which is discussed in section B. But, registering a client card 
involves an extra action other than just sending the 
information to the agents. When a client card is registrered, 
an  x.509 certificate is generated using the information like 
the MAC address, user name, email address, department etc. 
This certificate can be used by the wireless client to build a 
secured tunnel (using IPSec [10]) between the central 
administrator and the wireless node as shown in Fig 3.  
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 When an agent is registered, the central administrator 
will add the agent’s information, name, IP address and 
geographical location to its list of other agents’ records. This 
information is used for communicating with the agents. The 
central administrator can deregister an agent by removing 
the agent’s record from its list of agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 A VPN tunnel between the mobile node and the Central 
Administrator. 
B. Agents 
Agents are the main building blocks on which the whole 
system relies. It is the job of the agents to detect 
unauthorized wireless elements like rogue access points and 
promiscuous wireless nodes.  These agents also act as the 
first line of defense to protect the network from 
unauthorized use of the network resources.  
Each agent will be equipped with three network interface 
cards one of which is a wireless interface. This interface is 
necessary in order to sniff and detect rogue access points. 
The other two are normal ethernet cards which are used to 
connect the access point to the backbone (Fig 1).  The 
following are the functions of agents 
• Accept registration and deregistration messages for APs 
and client cards from the central administrator; 
• Keep scanning the cell for rogue access points (Those 
access points that are not registered with the central 
administrator) and notify the concerned personnel if 
found; 
• Detect promiscuous wireless nodes; and 
• Block unauthorized users (those who did not get their 
card registered with the central administrator). 
Each agent maintains a list of registered APs. When a 
new AP is registered with the central administrator, the 
central administrator will send the MAC address of the AP 
to all the agents. The agents, upon receiving the registration, 
will update their list of authorized APs by adding the new 
MAC address to their list. Similarly when a deregistration 
message is received from the central administrator, the 
corresponding MAC address would be removed from the list 
of trusted access points. In case of a client card, upon 
receiving a registration or deregistration message from the 
central administrator, the agents update their firewall policy 
to allow or block the user depending on the MAC address of 
the client card. Some might argue that vendors directly 
incorporate MAC filtering into their APs. But the main 
challenge lies in maintaining the list of such allowable MAC 
addresses in all the APs present on the backbone. There is 
no centralized solution that can update the list efficiently on 
all the APs.  Using our solution, we register the client card 
once at the central administrator thus making it easy to 
maintain the list. 
The other two important activities of the agents are, 
scanning their respective cells for rogue APs and for 
wireless promiscuous nodes. The agents scan for rogue APs 
by sniffing for beacon frames emitted by the APs. Each time 
a beacon is sniffed, the agent compares the source MAC 
address of the frame with the list of registered access points. 
If not found in the list of registered users, the agent 
considers the AP to be a rogue one and sends a message 
such as an email notification to the concerned personnel. 
The agents also maintain the list of unregistered APs they 
find in order to make sure that, they do not start a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack by continuously sending out messages 
for each beacon found.  
For detecting promiscuous wireless nodes, the agents use 
ARP Spoofing [9] to fool the promiscuous nodes. The 
Agents broadcast fake ARP messages, for all the IP 
addresses in the subnet that the agent operates in, with fake 
broadcast address (address that is not a true broadcast 
address but will be considered as broadcast address [9]). 
Should a promiscuous node be present in their respective 
cells, it will respond back with an ARP response (refer to [9] 
for details). Once the node is detected by its ARP response, 
the information, like the geographical location, the IP 
address, and time when the node was seen, will be passed on 
to the administrator. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section we discuss the implementation details of 
how exactly the registration and deregistration of access 
points, client cards and agents are done. We will also discuss 
the test bed on which the system has been successfully 
implemented and tested. 
A. Registration and Deregistration  
Figure 4(a) shows the GUI into which the user has to 
enter the required information. A copy of the information 
entered will be stored in a local flat file and another copy 
will be passed on to all the agents as shown in Figure 4(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4(a) Access Point registration GUI. 
Once the agents receive this information they will store 
the MAC address of the AP sent by the central administrator 
in their lists of registered access points as shown in Figure 
4(b). Likewise, when an access point is deregistered, the 
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 central administrator will instruct all the agents to the delete 
the corresponding information from their lists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4(b) access point registration process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(a) Client card registration GUI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(b) Client card registration process. 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate how the client cards are 
registered. The user has to enter the required information 
such as user name, the user’s department, etc. into the form 
shown in Figure 5(a). Once the information is submitted, an 
x.509 certificate will be emailed to the user of the card. This 
certificate can be used in implementing a secured tunnel 
between the user’s mobile node and the central 
administrator. A copy of the user information is stored in a 
local flat file before sending it to the agent. The agents upon 
receiving this information update their firewall policies, thus 
allowing the user to use the network resources. For 
deregistering a card, the central administrator instructs the 
agents to update their firewall policies to block the user, 
based on his/her MAC address, from using the network 
resources 
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the GUI and the process for 
registering agents. Once the information corresponding to a 
particular agent is submitted, it will be stored in a local flat 
file and used when registering access points and client cards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(a) Agent registration GUI. 
Similarly when an agent is deregistered, the 
corresponding entry will be deleted from the list of agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(b) Agent registration process. 
B. Detection rogue access points and promiscuous nodes 
The following two figures (Figures 7 and 8) show the 
pseudo code for detecting the rogue access points and the 
promiscuous nodes respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Procedure for rogue access point detection. 
Begin
sniff for 802.11b beacon frames 
if beacon found then 
  extract MAC 
  if MAC exists in Registered access points list 
    Iterate again 
  else 
    if SSID exists in rogue access points list 
      next 
    else 
      send warning message 
      add SSID to rogue access points list 
     End If 
   End if 
Else 
  Iterate again 
End if 
End 
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Figure 8 Procedure for promiscuous node detection. 
C. Test-bed 
The system has been implemented on a test bed, which 
consists of an Orinoco AP 1000 access point, a mobile node 
(a laptop) and a desktop, as shown in Figure 9. Both the 
agent and the central administrator are run on the single 
Linux box. FreeSWAN 1.96 with x.509 patch has been used 
as a VPN server to provide a secured connection to the 
mobile clients. For additional details and results refer to 
[11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Test-Bed. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The main goals of the project are, to make the wireless 
network as secured as possible – using VPN, and to detect 
intrusions as early as possible. The system has been fully 
tested for its accuracy and promptness in identifying the 
intrusions. One of the greatest advantages with our approach 
is that, the wireless cell to be monitored has no geographical 
restrictions. As long as the agent is connected to the Internet, 
the wireless cell can be at any distance from the central 
administrator. However, there are a few complications and 
restrictions involved. Every wireless element should be 
registered with the central administrator in order to be 
labeled as legitimate. Another limitation on the functionality 
of agents is its inability to detect a promiscuous node, which 
is not IP based. Since we use the technique of ARP 
spoofing, the agent can detect a promiscuous node if and 
only if that node is associated with a TCP/IP stack. Lastly, 
the system is meant for IEEE 802.11b networks. Should 
there be an access point, which does not comply with the 
IEEE standard, the system will fail in detecting it. 
The architecture employed in this project can be used to 
solve some of the existing problems in IEEE 802.11 
networks. One of the most important problems besides 
security is interoperability between different vendor 
products. For issues like the handoff mechanism, which does 
not have any standard defined, different vendors have their 
own proprietary solutions making it impossible to achieve 
interoperability. With our proposed architecture, agents can 
be allowed to transfer the clients between the cells instead of 
the access points performing the handoff. With this 
approach we can have access points from different vendors 
cooperating with one other. 
Another interesting improvement that can be made to the 
existing system is to allow restricted access to unregistered 
users instead of simply blocking them. Traffic can be 
analyzed at a corresponding agent each time an unregistered 
user accesses the wireless network. The results of the 
analysis can be communicated back to the central 
administrator, which decides the legitimacy of the user 
cumulatively using similar information from other agents. 
Using such a solution, even unregistered users can enjoy the 
convenience of wireless connectivity with, of course, limited 
access. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our agent-based intrusion detection and response system 
has been developed to provide a secured wireless LAN 
solution. Our main focus is on detecting unauthorized 
elements as soon as possible. By incorporating the feature to 
generate x.509 certificates, a VPN solution can be easily 
deployed to overcome the shortcomings of WEP. The 
architecture proposed here can serve as a building block for 
finding efficient solutions for various other problems 
discussed earlier. Since the whole project involves open 
source tools, the cost for deploying such a system is very 
minimal. 
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  Begin 
For each IP in the subnet 
   send a fake ARP and wait for reponse 
   if response seen 
      check log if entry exists; 
      if entry exits then 
         Iterate again 
      else 
         send a warning message and log the entry 
         Iterate again 
      End if 
    else 
       Iterate again 
    End if 
End 
496
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on June 17,2010 at 20:01:29 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
